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Introduction    
 
   The following paper is a reflection on the ethical and spiritual ambiguities of Monotheism. It 
proceeds through an examination of Thomas Aquinas’ concept of desire and René Girard’s 
notion of victimage. It is divided into two parts. In the first I examine Thomas’ ideas of desire 
and goodness in order to develop some key terms and concepts. In the second I employ these 
terms and concepts in a critique of René Girard’s victimage thesis, in an effort to shed light on 
the ‘uses and abuses’ of Judeo-Christian Monotheism.    
 
I. Totalism and Wholism        
 
Now we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature 
desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and 
perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form 
or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good.  
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica
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   Every teleological process is bipolar. This, I think, is the first thing we need to recognize if we 
are to make sense of desire, its relation to victimization, and the relation of both to the religious 
telos. It was one of the great insights of Augustine, echoed by Thomas Aquinas (above), to 
observe that there is no need to cite two primordial principles, a principle of good and a principle 
of evil, to account for the appearance of both in human and natural affairs. The bipolarity of the 
teleological process itself suffices to explain this opposition. To the extent that one is driven 
toward an end one exists in a state of relative dissatisfaction, to be finally resolved only when 
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that end is achieved. The notion of 'good,' as Thomas so astutely points out, is intrinsic to the 
phenomenon of desire itself. Desire points to what, for it, is its own good. In the fact of desire 
the notion of good is already implicit. On the other hand, the inability to achieve or sustain the 
desirable is, by that fact, undesirable; in the mythico-ethical language of religion: 'evil.' Thus, 
'good' and 'evil' may be regarded as simply the polar extremes of the teleological process itself; a 
process mediated by the drive toward the one and away from the other, a drive that, in the 
context of human and animal life, has the name 'desire.'        
   Let’s pursue the Thomistic explication a little further. “Every nature,” says Thomas, “desires 
its own being.” This seems an odd statement on the face of it. Doesn't every nature already 
possess its own being? Isn't desire always a desire for some other, some beyond, something, 
precisely, that is not one's own? At this point, of course, we might drag in the Aristotelian 
metaphysical categories Thomas is working with, and begin to speak in terms of essences, 
potentialities, and actualities, but let’s keep it simple for a moment. Quite apart from the 
viability of any grandscale metaphysical architectonic, there is, I think, a simple insight 
expressed in the above statement. It is that, to desire at all, is to be related, by that very fact, to 
the object of desire. In terms of Thomistic metaphysics we would say that a 'nature' defines a 
desire, in that every nature desires its perfection; i.e., its fulfilled actualization, and is driven 
onward until it establishes it. But even from a more modest, and more modern, 
phenomenological approach, we can arrive at a similar conclusion, except stated from the other 
end up: every desire, we might say, defines a nature, insofar as desire entails some sense of lack 
in one's current state vis-à-vis some state of fulfillment or wholeness. In other words, we can 
only make sense of the concept 'lack' in terms of some drive toward wholeness that is, as long as 
there is lack, as yet unrealized. One can only lack to the extent that something is lacking. One 
lacks, and therefore desires, then, to the extent that one is not whole.         
   There is, then, a relationship between what we call goodness, badness, wholeness, and desire, 
which might be stated thus: Every teleological being desires a state of wholeness, which is, by 
that fact, characterized by the positive evaluative term good. Likewise, every teleological being 
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avers from a state of privation which is, by that fact, characterized by the negative evaluative 
term bad.  
   But I still don't think we have plumbed the full depths of Thomas' statement that “every nature 
desires its own being.” In this statement, perhaps, the whole dilemma of inter-human ethical 
relations is contained. Precisely insofar as I desire something, I don't have it, it is not mine. Yet 
precisely insofar as I desire it, I feel I should have it, it is, in some sense, ideally mine. It belongs 
to me, even though it may be yours – even though it may be you. My good may, precisely, be 
your evil. The lion consumes the gazelle. Good for the lion. Bad for the gazelle. This is not 
relativism. This is conflict.  
   There is a way of reading nature, and the Cosmos at large, that simply accepts such conflict as 
irresolvable. Every nature desires its own being, which, as it turns out, entails the consumption of 
other beings. Success belongs to the 'fittest,' which, in this context, simply means, the successful. 
Beyond the life-struggle there is no good and evil. The projection of good and evil into an 
hypostatized beyond – Nietzsche tells us – is simply a ruse of the life-struggle itself, through 
which the weak seek to beguile the strong into respecting them, and even honoring them, in their 
weakness. 
   And yet there is still more, it seems to me, to be found in the statement, “every nature desires 
its own being.” The possibility of making such a statement is uniquely human. Thomas does not 
say “my nature desires its own being,” but “every nature.” The statement itself is an implicit 
awareness of otherness qua otherness. This is something the lion, presumably, cannot know. For 
the lion all that exists is what is within reach and what is, as yet, beyond reach. All is an 
extension of me. There are no ethical dilemmas nor ethical decisions. One can easily sympathize 
with Nietzsche's nostalgia for the unambiguous lion-like life. But it is not Christian resentment 
that has catapulted us forever beyond the possibility of such a life. It is the structure of human 
knowing itself; which is 'cursed' with the knowledge of the otherness of the other, forcing upon 
us the ethical life, forever barring us from the Edenic simplicity of the life of pure instinct. This 
is the 'knowledge of good and evil' that has driven us outside the gates of Eden. 
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 “Behold, the man has become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put 
forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and live for ever...” Therefore the Lord 
God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the land from which he was taken.' 
(Gen. 3:22) 
 
  Thus, the dilemma of humanity: to live with the needs of an animal and the mind of a god.  
  There is no way out but through. No way back to Edenic simplicity. Wholeness takes upon 
itself a new dimension outside the gates of Eden. Again, Thomas seems to get it right: "Now the 
created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other creatures do not 
attain to the universal, but only to something particular...Consequently, the perfection of the 
rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that 
which it acquires through a supernatural participation in divine goodness"
2
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  To “attain to the universal” is to see beyond oneself, and, hence, to see the otherness of the 
other. This is the god's-eye view, in which every nature is seen as “desiring its own being” and, 
hence, defining its proper good. No nature is privileged. Not even mine. But the god's must pity 
us our god-like perspective. For they, having eaten of the Tree of Life as well as the Tree of 
Knowledge, are situated in eternity, and are free of the life-needs that particularize desire. Thus, 
they can view the whole with equanimity and calm. Not so the animal-gods called human. We 
tasted of the Knowledge but not of the Life – and therefore live between the worlds, native to 
neither. 
  
  Let me define two Universalisms; the one I will call 'Wholism' and the other I will call 
'Totalism.' I define Totalism as a system organized around a single principle, in which the 
principle itself is considered sacrosanct, and regarded as the supreme, if not the sole, good. In a 
Totalistic system, each member is for the sake of the Total. Only the Totalic principle is an end 
in itself. 
  I define Wholism as a system organized around the principle that every individual is sacrosanct; 
the whole is for the sake of each. Each member is an end in itself. 
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  In a Totalistic system, each is in service to the principle. In a Wholistic system, the principle is 
in service to each. 
   Every organism, every 'nature,' is Totalistic in the pursuit of its own being. Every nature, 
pursuing its own good, is a little totalistic universe. But the gods, having eaten of both the 
Knowledge and the Life, are called to Wholism. The gods, let us say, do not have a nature, but a 
supernature. A supernature does not have a good peculiar to itself. Its good is the good of the 
whole – which is to say, the good of each. This is why the nature of the gods is love, not desire. 
Desire defines a nature. Love defines a supernature.  
  The animal-gods, the humans, having eaten of the Knowledge and not of the Life, are caught in 
between. And there is no way out but through. But neither is there a simple way through. The 
struggle of human life is to find the way through; somehow to transform desire into love. This is 
the human challenge, and, specifically, the challenge of religious wholism. 
   When the human nature becomes totalistic it moves toward the demonic, ethically and 
spiritually. It becomes ethically demonic insofar as it endeavors to subsume all otherness in its 
totality. It becomes spiritually demonic insofar as it continues to recognize the otherness of the 
other as it consumes it. It is this latter that defines the spiritual evil of the demonic. The demonic 
is agential privation. The demonic creates privation through its act of consumption. The 
demonic consumes the other, knowing the other's otherness and, hence, knowing the other's 
intrinsic good, which it destroys for itself.   
   When the human nature becomes wholistic it moves toward the holy, ethically and spiritually. 
It becomes ethically holy insofar as it endeavors to maximize the good of the other. It becomes 
spiritually holy insofar as it delights in the good of the other, and achieves its own good through 
such delight. Such is the spiritual good of the holy. 
   But the human nature is never finally holy, nor finally demonic. It is ambiguous. This 
ambiguity, it must be stressed again and again, against all totalistic moralism, is not its sin, but 
its nature. As a result, the human nature is called on to perform a trick that not even the gods 
need master. The Wholistic human being, in respecting all natures, must respect its own as well. 
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Total sacrifice can never be demanded, for only a Total being could demand a total sacrifice. But 
the God of the Whole demands that one love oneself as well as the other. 
   Monotheistic religion wavers between the totalistic and the wholistic. Nowhere is the 
ambiguity of human nature so apparent as in the image of the biblical God; a Wholistic ethic 
represented in the form of a Totalistic being. It is the danger of Totalism that underlies all 
prohibitions against imaging God. A Totalistic God would be supremely visible, and cast its 
shadow on all below it. But the Wholistic God is a pure transparency. Light goes through the 
Wholistic God, it is not trapped there. Thus, there can be no image of the Wholistic God. The 
face of the Whole shines in every particular.  
     
II. René Girard and Victimage 
 
   As much as I sympathize with many of René Girard's concerns, and acknowledge his often 
insightful analyses of human motivations, I find myself unpersuaded as to his fundamental 
claims. According to Girard, all human civilizations originate with what he calls a “founding 
murder” at the beginning of their history. To state Girard's thesis briefly: Human beings have a 
primal mimetic instinct which induces them to imitate each other's behavior. In primitive 
hominid clans, this leads to intensive rivalries, as individual hominids vie with each other for the 
same object, whose value becomes inflated due to the mimetic escalation of the desire attached 
to it. The conflict itself, subject to the same mimetic forces as the desire, escalates to the point of 
crisis. This leads finally to all the members of a given group focusing upon one member and 
murdering him or her. This murder has a unifying and calming effect on the clan, which then 
associates its new-found peace with the victim; who becomes sacrilized and worshipped as the 
first 'god.' Now, in the name of this new god, rituals and prohibitions are established to control 
mimetic rivalry and preserve the peace of, what may now be called, 'the community.' The most 
important of these rituals is the reenactment of the 'founding murder,' now reinterpreted as a 
'sacrifice' to the god through whom the peace is secured.   
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   Girard claims to find voluminous confirmation for his theory in the anthropological literature 
concerning primitive ritual and myth. Although I am not in a position to do a comprehensive  
anthropological review in order to test this claim, it strikes me, on the face of it, that the 
polytheisms of primitive cultures, in which a multitude of diverse gods are honored and 
associated with a variety of specialized functions; i.e., the rain god, the sun god, the god of the 
hearth, the god of war, etc. implies that the emergence of gods has more to do with an attempt to 
commune with the varied forces of life and nature than with a single victimage event. 
   Even more difficult to accept is Girard's claim that language itself emerges from this founding 
murder
3
. In this, I think, is a profound failure to recognize the true significance of language, 
which, in my view, is the precondition (not the consequence) of the emergence of the gods and, 
for that matter, of any possibility of victimage in the Girardian sense. The human cognitive 
system is every bit as distinctive and complex a structure as the human respiratory or digestive 
systems. It is as unreasonable to suggest that this structure might have emerged suddenly from a 
particular historical event as it would be to suggest that digestion might have emerged from such 
an event. Girard speaks of the victim as the first 'signifier,' seeming to imply that all that is 
required to account for language is that we account for the emergence of signifiers. But the 
distinctive mark of the cognitive faculty, of which language is the outward expression, is not that 
it employs signs for things found in the empirical world but, quite the contrary, that it is able to 
experience the world in terms of universals not found there. For instance, the word 'tree' refers, 
not to some particular tree, but to the class of tree-like things. It is impossible to point to what 
the word 'tree' refers to because the meaning of the word, as a universal, transcends any 
particular instantiation of it. This is why language must employ signs and why there can be no 
mere 'pointing' language. That to which the sign refers has no material reality. Its only 
concreteness, thus, is in the sign itself. 
  The capacity to experience the world in terms of universals cannot have suddenly emerged one 
day as a consequence of some contingent, historical event. Although customs and rituals may 
spring forth from such an event, whole organic structures cannot. On the contrary, it is, I suggest, 
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the linguistic, or cognitive, faculty itself that gives rise to many of the phenomena that Girard 
attempts to explain through the victimage hypothesis; including the phenomenon of victimage 
(i.e., scapegoating) itself.  
   As noted above, every teleological structure is bipolar, including, of course, every living 
creature. Thus, every life-form lives within the context of the basic categories 'beneficial' and 
'harmful.' For the vast majority of life-forms, these categories play themselves out through 
strictly organic processes. The amoeba absorbs what is beneficial and excretes what is harmful, 
with no capacity to think or even experience the distinction. As we climb the phylogenetic scale 
these categories enter more and more into the awareness of the organisms in question. At the 
level of the human being, this general awareness becomes conceptual; the organic distinction 
'beneficial/harmful' becomes the conceptual distinction 'good/bad.' This, I would suggest, is the 
first binary distinction human beings make. It is a distinction that is implicitly value-laden; 
which serves to explain why, as Derrida notes, so many of our binary oppositions ('traces' of the 
original, one might say) tend to privilege one term above the other.  
   Human beings live within the context of the universal, and this goes a long way to explaining 
what might be called the 'metaphysicalizing' of human concern; which gives rise to the 
polytheistic gods. Many of these gods seem to be nothing other than personified universals; the 
personification of which is most likely primordial. That is, rather than suppose that 
personification was added as a gloss to universal notions originally abstract and 'pristine,' it 
seems more likely that many universals were conceived from the first in personified or 
spiritualized terms – such terms being naturally expressive of inter- and intrahuman experience. 
This would imply that the emergence of the gods simply accompanied the emergence of 
language, i.e., cognition, as such, in a perfectly natural way – requiring no primordial murder to 
account for it. 
  Among the most significant things that universal conceptualization does is to make human 
beings aware of death, both as a general and a personal possibility. This results, I would suggest, 
from the universalized conception of 'myself' as a coherent entity. Immediate experience does 
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not render 'myself' to me. The 'myself' that has a recollected history and an anticipated future, is 
involved in a variety of relationships and manifests a multitude of character traits, is never 
immediately available to me as a whole. I am always in this particular situation, engaged in this 
particular activity, driven by this particular desire. My capacity, nevertheless, to regard myself as 
a whole is associated, I would say, with the same universalizing capacity that gives rise to 
language and cognition in general. Insofar as humans are able to regard themselves as 'wholes,' 
they are, by that very fact, able to envision (and thus experience) the possibility of a total threat 
to their being – something, we might conjecture, that no other animal can experience in quite the 
same way. Thus, with the 'eating of the tree of knowledge,' i.e., the cognitive advance of human 
beings, 'death' truly does enter the world.  
   Insofar as it does, and insofar as it represents a total threat to the organism, it needs to be 
explicitly addressed. This propels human thought into mythological and metaphysical musing 
about the world of the beyond. The concept of death implies the concept of transcendence. That 
is, to the extent that one can think one's death, one, by that very fact, thinks beyond it and, hence, 
beyond the whole of the empirical world. Religious mythology endeavors to describe the world 
as whole, encompassing the 'here' and the 'beyond,' and thereby, to lend some definition to the 
threatening beyond. Ritualistic activities emerge, then, as ways of responding to and dealing with 
these comprehensive concerns of life and death. The cognitive capacity of human beings, 
coupled with the teleological character of all organic creatures, is itself enough to account for 
the emergence of primitive religion and culture; there is no need to posit a 'victimage 
mechanism.' 
   Cognition proceeds through unification and distinction. One must know that a maple and an 
oak are both trees, just as one must know that a maple is not an oak. Likewise, one must know 
that oneself is not an other. Thus, whatever else may be entailed in the mature experience of the 
other as other, it is, first of all, a cognitive distinction, and only possible for human beings 
because of their capacity to make such distinctions; i.e., to universalize. The possibility of seeing 
the other as other, as distinct from self, is the possibility of the ethical as such and, I would say, 
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of human civilization itself. Further, it is only to the extent that one can see the other as an other 
that one can give something to an other. The idea of the gift, in which one gives 'of oneself' to 
benefit another, is only possible in the context of a cognitive system in which self and other are 
discriminated. It strikes me that this is the original significance of sacrifice; it is an offering of a 
gift to the gods, either by way of honoring them, or, more primitively, by way of influencing 
them to bestow favors. The delineation of different kinds of sacrifices for different kinds of 
needs and occasions seems to strongly favor this interpretation over Girard's. If all one does, in 
primitive sacrifice, is symbolically reenact the 'founding murder,' why so many different 
sacrifices for different seasons and purposes?  
   As for the violence of animal sacrifice, this needs to be viewed from the perspective of 
societies that slaughtered animals daily for food. The sacrificial lamb is to be slaughtered 
anyway, if not as sacrifice then as food – what makes it sacrificial, then, is not that it is 
slaughtered, but that it is given to the god. It is not the violent, but the gift-like, character of the 
act that distinguishes it as sacrifice.    
   Of particular concern to Christianity is the idea of the expiatory sacrifice. Any theory of 
expiation would require the elaboration of a theory of sin, too ambitious for this short work. But 
a few brief points can be made. Offense is an ethical concept that can only have meaning to the 
extent that one is aware of the other as other; that is, of the other as a “nature that desires its own 
good.” The ethical makes a demand; i.e., that the other's good be respected as such. It is not to be 
offended against. Thus, the ethical imperative is sacrificial in its essence, for it requires that one 
give up one's claim to absolute value in acknowledgment of the equally legitimate claim of the 
other. The expiatory sacrifice may be seen as a symbolic gesture in which the penitent expresses 
his or her willingness to give up any claim to personal totality in deference to the Wholism 
represented by God. It would be specifically called for after sin, insofar as all sin involves an 
implicit totalistic claim on the part of the sinner who, in sinning, disregards the claim of the 
other.      
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   But, as Paul Ricoeur notes in his The Symbolism of Evil, the notions of sin and expiation have 
a long development and can only be fully explicated in the context of that development. His 
notion of the primordial symbol of defilement, as “a quasi-physical infection that points toward a 
quasi-moral unworthiness”4, resonates well with what we have been saying. As the biological 
categories of 'beneficial/harmful' become universalized as good/bad, ethicized as right/wrong, 
and spiritualized as good/evil, there is an intermingling of the biological category of 'taint' with 
the ethical category of 'fault' and the spiritual category of 'guilt' – or rather, there is an original 
indifferentiation that is only slowly and imperfectly articulated into these distinct categories, 
such that, even in their fullest articulation, they each continue to retain traces of the others.   
   But as Ricoeur also notes, even at its earliest stages the symbol of defilement is never simply 
reducible to the immediacy of physical stain. It is always symbol, which is to say, it is always 
universal. It is not the physical stain itself that the symbol of defilement points to, but the idea of 
stain. This idea, precisely because it is an idea, abstracted from the physical and universalized as 
symbol, is now available to be applied to anything – one's body, one's household, one's 'soul,' 
one's society. It is the universalization process itself that makes for this possibility; that allows 
the organic sense of 'harmful' to become the cognitive category of 'evil' (or, to state it in non-
reductionistic terms, that allows human beings to see the organic sense of harm as one instance 
of the more general category of evil).   
  This is the context in which, in my view, we can best understand the scapegoating mechanism 
of such concern to Girard. The totalistic community, acting upon symbols and concerns derived 
mainly from the realm of the organic, endeavors to purge itself of its polluting members so as to 
purify itself of defilement, which has become the predominant symbol through which the 
suffering and hardship of the community is understood. If the 'stain' can be effaced, the hardship 
will be brought to an end. The victim, thus, is symbolically linked to the 'taint' that has corrupted 
society and needs to be removed. The fact that this has a galvanizing effect upon the members of 
the community may be attributed to, first, the primordial power of the organic symbols 
themselves, deeply rooted in instinctual drives and fears, and secondly, the fact that any idea 
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becomes conceptually clear only in contradistinction to some opposing idea or ideas. Thus the 
idea of the community as Totality requires an opposing 'evil' or 'chaos' or 'stain' to define itself 
against. 
   It is precisely the scapegoat, however, who is not the sacrifice. The sacrifice is offered to the 
Lord, and must be without blemish to be accounted a worthy offering. The scapegoat is driven 
from the community, and is invested with all the blemish of the community in order to effectuate 
purgation. Although the two mechanisms serve a similar expiatory function, they nevertheless 
represent opposing expiatory movements – the one of driving sin away and the other of drawing 
holiness near. It is only in the Cross, where all symbols converge, that these two movements are 
conflated in the 'sacrificial lamb' who 'bears our iniquities.' Girard seems to project the Christian 
interpretation of sacrifice backward, onto pre-Christian practices, while, ironically, denying it to 
'true' Christianity itself. But in the Hebrew Bible the sacrifice is neither scapegoat nor 
punishment; it is offering.              
   There is some sense in which it is appropriate that Christ's Passion, as the summation of all 
expiation, should also be the conflation of all symbols of expiation. Thus Christ is, at once, 
sacrificial offering, purgative scapegoat, and penitential sufferer. But beyond all this – and here I 
think Girard gets it absolutely right – he is victim (and this is not a symbol). I fully agree with 
Girard that this piling together of expiatory symbols, which he calls the 'sacrificial reading,' 
creates theological difficulties for Christianity. But at the same time this very piling together 
may itself be taken as having special symbolic significance. It makes the Cross, in a sense, the 
'symbol to end all symbols'; and, as such, a transcendence of the totalistic distortion of ritualistic 
symbology itself.   
   Such symbology becomes distorted when its symbolic character is lost and the notion of 
service to God comes more and more to be taken in a literal sense; i.e., as subordination to a 
Total Being who is propelled by his own personal telos to demand submission from others. The 
notion of what such a God may want need not be clearly defined, but the very belief or suspicion 
that such a God wants anything (for himself), and thus issues commands from his own desire 
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rather than from Wholistic love, turns God into a Totalistic principle. The often abused language 
of reward and punishment in relation to God is a constant temptation to totalism; for rewards and 
punishments are extrinsic inducements offered for behavior that is, by that very fact, not engaged 
in for its own intrinsic merit. Such language may be necessary at a certain primitive level of 
ethical development, insofar as external inducements may be needed to motivate the person who 
is not yet moved by the ethical itself. But, ideally, the ethical speaks in the name of the good of 
the other; and one sufficiently mature with respect to it is moved by its own intrinsic goodness; 
not extrinsic inducements. 
  The 'sacrificial reading' of Jesus' death on the Cross is a paradox of totalism and wholism. The 
insistence that God demands suffering as a punishment to satisfy his need for Justice is pure 
Totalism. Justice, essentially, has nothing to do with punishment and cannot demand it (what 
might this even mean?). The threat of punishment is employed to deter those who are not yet 
sufficiently motivated by the intrinsic value of Justice to show it proper respect. Beyond this, and 
a possible penitential efficacy, punishment has no function. The idea that Justice itself is 
somehow satisfied by exacting suffering is totalistic anthropomorphism at its worst (it appears to 
be a hypostatization of the human lust for revenge). On the other hand, the doctrine that such 
satisfaction can be made substitutionally seems, at first, an attempt to transcend Totalism; for it 
implies that satisfaction is not, in fact, required in a literal sense. But then, the insistence that 
this very substitutional act is required is totalism yet again. The question, in other words, is who 
is the sacrifice for? If it is for the satisfaction of God, we are in the domain of totalism. If it is for 
the sanctification of the penitent, we are in the domain of wholism. The sacrificial reading of the 
Passion seems to me like a totalistic doctrine forever trying to transcend itself toward wholism 
and never quite succeeding – as does much else in Christian doctrine.              
   “Man was not made for the Sabbath, the Sabbath was made for man.” In this statement from 
Mark we have the entire conflict between Totalistic and Wholistic religion expressed in 
miniature. I think it is possible to read the conflict between Jesus and the Pharisees, not as 
primarily a conflict between a 'law-based' and a 'faith-based' piety, nor even between an 'inner' 
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and an 'outer' spirituality, but between a Wholistic and a Totalistic interpretation of God. Both 
law and faith are subject to totalistic distortion, and have both been so distorted. Both, likewise, 
can be vehicles of wholistic expression, and have both been employed for such expression. Jesus' 
emphasis upon the intrinsic meaning and value of the law, as opposed to its extrinsic demands 
and inducements, is an implicit turn toward a wholistic ethic. The importance of the 
commandments is in what they mean for human welfare, not to what extent they 'serve' an 
extrinsic God. At his best, then, Jesus is a representative of a Wholistic Monotheism against the 
totalistic distortions of those who would argue that 'man was made for the Sabbath.' The 
questions at issue, and the ones Jesus raises, are the holiest of all questions: what is of real 
value? What is to be affirmed? What are the commandments for? What, finally, matters?  
   I find myself in agreement with Girard when he sees in the Old and New Testaments the 
unfolding of a progressive revelation. At first the Monotheistic God retains many of the features 
of the neighboring polytheistic gods, in whose 'image,' one might say, he is originally cast. There 
are, however, a few critical differences. This God, unlike the others, seems to have a particular 
interest in ethical concerns, he insists upon being recognized as the One and (at first supreme 
and finally only) God, and he has a peculiar dislike of being photographed (i.e., imaged in any 
way). He requires a refocusing of the attention away from the particularities of life, to the One 
from whom all particulars flow, and in terms of whom they are all sanctified. The Monotheistic 
God, in contrast to the polytheistic gods with their finite charges, sees with the eyes of the Whole 
itself. He does not see from one perspective, but from all perspectives (Ezekiel’s vision of the 
chariot "full of eyes" is a remarkable expression of this). He is the Knowledge of the Whole. 
   As the eyes of the Whole he is the ideal in relation to which the universalizing capacity of 
human cognition is the imperfect 'image.' As such, he is, one might say, its metaphysical 
counterpart. Just as the polytheistic gods may be thought of as 'personified universals,' 
correspondent to an emerging human cognition of the universal forces of nature, so the 
Monotheistic God is the Universal of universals, correspondent to the further development of 
this cognitive capacity as it begins to comprehend the whole as whole. His ethical concern is no 
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accident. It follows directly from the idea of a Being who would see the Whole as such; who 
sees perfectly that “every nature desires its own good” (not just mine) and, therefore, no nature 
may violate another in the name of itself. 
   But to the extent that this God of the Whole becomes Totalistic (or simply retains the traces of 
finitude from its polytheistic past) it approaches the tyrannical. This is why the prohibition 
against graven images is so critical. The moment the God of the Whole is envisioned as a finite 
nature seeking to fulfill itself, as opposed to an infinite supernature, seeking the fulfillment of 
all, the moment it becomes opaque as opposed to transparent, visible as opposed to invisible, it 
begins to absorb the light of the Whole rather than disseminating it. Everyone becomes servant 
to a principle that is servant to no one. This is what Nietzsche calls ‘nihilism’; it is the perpetual 
danger of Monotheism.  
   But (Nietzsche notwithstanding) at first this danger must be risked, for the only way to elevate 
the human mind to the Whole is through the particular with which it is familiar. And the animal-
god must be elevated, for its emergent cognitive capacity, wrapped in an animal nature, is a 
constant temptation for it to claim Totality for itself, to the destruction of everyone else. It is this 
Totalistic rivalry between individuals and cultures (and not mimetic rivalry) that is the supreme 
danger to the earth and everything in it. So the first value this God of the Whole must teach is 
humility. He is like the mother who says to her squabbling children, “If you can't share the toys 
among you I'm going to take them away and keep them for myself.” But the point isn't to take the 
toys away so that Mother can have them for herself – or so that nobody can have them out of 
some perverse regard for self-abnegation. The point is to teach the children to share, which 
requires that the children learn to give, and, thus, to give up, i.e., to sacrifice.  
  But Monotheism is a dangerous game. The Monotheistic God is always in danger of being 
turned into the only value, which – as Nietzsche so aptly points out – turns negation itself into a 
value. When the Hebrew prophets rail against sacrifice it is not Girardian victimage they are 
condemning, it is this: that honor to the supreme God has supplanted the very honoring this God 
cries out for: the honoring of the other. The prophets are not concerned with the victims of 
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sacrifice but the victims of neglect, the widows and orphans and indigent. These people are not 
persecuted in order to control mimetic rivalry – they are neglected and trampled upon as the 
powerful pursue their totalistic aims of wealth, power, and glory. They are victims of Totality, 
not mimetism. 
  Beyond this (or supplementary to it) the Monotheistic God is always in danger of being used as 
a Totalistic banner with which one culture can oppress another, or, for that matter, itself. Again, 
precisely to the extent that the Monotheistic God is opaque, precisely to the extent that it absorbs 
value rather than disseminating it, it can become a source of pride to the particular culture, 
nation, or institution, who profess to serve it, but who, in fact, use it for their own Totalistic 
ends. This pride can be extremely subtle for it involves, not a personal elevation, but a 
communal identification with the glory of the Supreme God, an identification that may appear as 
great individual humility and submission. But such identification is itself a distortion. No one 
can identify with the God of Wholism, for there is no Entity to identify with. The God of 
Wholism is a pure transparency. Light goes through and shines in the faces of the “least among 
you.” To identify with the God of Wholism is to identify with these. 
   This, then, is the battle that rages between Jesus and the Pharisees; the former representing a 
Wholistic ethic and the latter representing its totalistic distortion. (It needs to be said, however, 
that of all the cultures that have professed Monotheism, the Jews, on the whole, have been least 
abusive of it. One of the tragic ironies of the Gospel accounts is that they take what was 
originally an intra-religious conflict, indicative of the ethical and spiritual vitality of the Jewish 
religion, and turn it into an attack on the Jews themselves. But Jews have always been open to 
critical self-scrutiny – as should be apparent from the fact that, perhaps uniquely among all 
cultures, they revere texts in which they themselves are criticized. If not for the Jewish openness 
to critical self-evaluation, the texts of the Prophets would never have been preserved for later 
Christian exegetes to use as a bludgeon against them. Jesus' criticisms are very much in the 
tradition of Judaism itself.) 
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   Be that as it may, in the context of the Gospels it is Jesus who represents the Wholistic ethic 
and the Pharisees its totalistic abuse. Jesus, at his best, reveals the true essence of the God of 
Wholism, whose essence is pure dissemination; i.e., love. “The Sabbath is for the sake of man”: 
The Whole is for the sake of each. In this context it is interesting to consider the two “great 
commandments” that Jesus cites: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all 
thy soul, and with all thy might.” Left to itself, this commandment might seem the very 
embodiment of totalism. One is to give God everything, which leaves nothing over for anything 
else. But, properly considered, it is simply the first move of Wholistic sanctification, which lifts 
the mind up from the exclusive valuing of oneself to the valuing of the Wholistic God, in order 
to redirect it down again to the valuing of all selves. Thus this great commandment is 
immediately supplemented with: “And thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” From a totalistic 
perspective these two commandments seem contradictory. If one is to give God all one's love 
how is one to have any left over for one's neighbor and oneself? The traditional way out is to 
suggest that one is to love others 'for the sake of' God – as if they are not really worth loving but 
should be loved nonetheless, as a kind of favor to God (who seems to have this peculiar penchant 
for loving the worthless).  
   A more satisfying exegesis, I think, is derived from Wholism. To love God is to love one's 
neighbor and oneself. There is no contradiction; on the contrary, there is mutual immanence. 
Totalism suggests that for God to have all worth, everyone else must have none. But this is a 
great distortion. Wholistically, God's infinite worth is the worth of all that derives from God; “of 
every nature pursuing its own being.” In Totalism God becomes the supreme negation. In 
Wholism the supreme affirmation. Totalism turns God into the supreme No. Wholism sees God 
as the supreme Yes. 
   Jesus is crucified by two totalisms, mutually opposed to each other (as all totalisms must be) 
but, in this instance, enjoying a marriage of convenience: Pharisaic religious Totalism and 
Roman political Totalism. He may be regarded, thus, as the paradigmatic 'victim of Totality.' 
Girard's emphasis upon Jesus as victim is, in my view, right on. But it is not some primordial 
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'mimetic victimage mechanism' that Jesus is victim of, it is the totalistic ethic itself and, more 
specifically, the distortions of monotheistic Totalism. As a victim of monotheistic Totalism, 
Jesus' crucifixion should expose it and explode it forevermore – in the name of a Wholism that 
overcomes all totalistic distortion (i.e., 'legalism'). This is the insight that Paul, it seems to me, 
grasps at as he tries to interpret Jesus' crucifixion as the expiatory rite to end all expiatory rites. 
But Paul never seems to find the language to move him finally beyond the juridical symbols that 
have become so oppressive, and so ends up interpreting Jesus' death in juridical terms – laying 
the foundation for the 'sacrificial reading' that Girard so pointedly condemns – and bequeathing 
to the world the great ambiguity that is the Christian religion.  
   But perhaps Girard is also right in suggesting that the world was unprepared for anything else. 
The double movement of the Wholistic revelation – up toward the whole and back down to all 
particulars – may require a totalistic phase to induce the gaze upward. Perhaps, even, (as 
Teilhard's work suggests) a certain globalization of human culture is required before Wholism 
can be introduced in a viable way. Thus, the ambiguity of the Christian religion may be the only 
reason there still is a Christian religion, whose ambiguity can now, perhaps, be exposed and 
corrected in the name of a message that, like a time-capsule, has been lying there in wait for us. 
Again, Girard seems to me to get it right when he suggests that there is something in the 
Christian kerygma itself that resists the very distortions in which it has so often been cast – and 
that this something is the victimage of Jesus, whose impotence on the Cross is a revelation of 
God’s identification with the abused, oppressed, and persecuted; the victims, and critics, of 
Totality.       
           
   So, after disagreeing with so many of Girard's premises I find myself in close accord with 
many of his conclusions. The victimage of Jesus is key, and to the extent that the sacrificial 
reading of the Cross is employed to bolster a Totalistic Monotheism it needs to be seen, not only 
as counterproductive, but as diametrically opposed to the truly revolutionary aspect of Jesus' 
message. But, again, I differ with Girard's analysis as to the roots and meaning of victimage. I 
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don't think it has much to do with 'mimetic' tendencies on the part of human beings but, much 
closer to the traditional Christian doctrine of sin, with a temptation to totalism inherent in the 
nature of the animal-god ever since it became animal-god; i.e., ever since being 'cast from the 
garden' into the ambiguous world of ethical responsibility. Nor would I agree with Girard's belief 
that the New Testament in general, or the Gospels in particular, represent a pristine expression of 
the best in religion. On the contrary, I find in the New Testament the same ambiguity to be found 
in the rest of Christianity, and in all of Monotheism, and in humanity at large. If God intends to 
hand us the answer fully-formed he hasn't done so yet, as far as I can tell. Personally, though, I 
don't think that this is the Wholistic God's style. 
 
   Before concluding I would like to say just a word about the relevance of these ideas to trends 
in contemporary thought. It seems to me that much of modernism, and post-modernism, can be 
seen as a reaction against Totalism in all its forms. The epistemological caution of modern 
philosophy and modern science seems, in so many ways, to have emerged in reaction to the 
epistemic totalism implicit in the ideas of scriptural inerrancy and doctrinal infallibility 
propounded by the Church. The secular/political totalisms of Communism (a quintessential 
example of a wholistic ethic gone wrong), and Nazism (the quintessential revelation of 
Totalism's evil) has taken this reaction to a new level which, I think, we see in post-modernism. 
Through a critique of language and meaning as such, the post-modernists cast doubt on the 
possibility of any absolute truth-claim, and thereby permanently undermine the foundation for 
any totalistic ethic or ideology. Indeed, the pluralism celebrated by the post-modernists might 
well be seen as a wholism afraid to declare itself as such for fear of totalistic distortion. (The 
suspicion that Derrida may be an undeclared 'negative theologian' seems to me in line with this 
interpretation. And, of course, Levinas’ protest against totalism is explicit.) 
   But post-modernism, in my view, is too reactionary and negative to be anything more than an 
interim movement. It is simply the final episode in the protest against the totalistic phase of 
human universalism; which, as I have suggested, emerges as a feature of the cognitive 
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development of the human mind itself. Given the universalism inherent in human nature, there is 
no way back to animal-like instinctivism, or even simple communitarian pluralism. Human 
beings will think in universal terms; the question is whether those terms will be Wholistic or 
Totalistic. But even this is not a real option, for Totalism chokes the life out of even its 
adherents, not to mention its opponents, and so is not a sustainable alternative. The only real 
question, then, is whether humanity will survive long enough to realize its Wholistic destiny. 
  This remains to be seen.        
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